Searching for Hijackers:
Constitutionality, Costs, and Alternatives
In 1930, a group of Peruvian revolutionaries commandeered a Ford
trimotor aircraft and perpetrated the world's first recorded airplane
hijacking.1 Since then there have been 394 hijacking attempts,2 of which
248 have been successful. 3 Most attempts have occurred in the last five
years 4 prompting some to proclaim the existence of a hijacking "epidemic." 5 In an effort to prevent would-be hijackers from boarding
aircraft, preboarding security procedures have been instituted at airportsO-procedures that raise serious constitutional 7 and policy questions. This comment first describes the history of airplane hijacking
and the United States response to the problem. It then discusses the
constitutionality of the airport security program and compares its costs
1 J. AnaY, THE SKY PRATES (1972); FAA, Office of Air Transportation Security, Domestic
and Foreign Aircraft Hijackings, Dec. 1, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Domestic and Foreign
Aircraft Hijackings].
2 U.S. Dep't of Transportation, FAA, Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Registered Aircraft,
Jan. 12, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Registered Aircraft]. FAA,
Office of Air Transportation Security, Worldwide Reported Hijacking Attempts, Dec. 1,
1972, reports 391 attempted hijackings since 1930; this minor discrepency results from
different figures for the number of foreign hijackings in 1969, 1970, and 1972. The FAA
and the Justice Department do not always agree on whether an incident should be considered a hijacking attempt. See note 47 infra. The incidence of such disagreement, however, is rare, and the only distinction seems to be where the offender has no diversionary
motive, but only one of sabotage or self-destruction. Such cases are considered hijackings
by the Justice Department, but not by the FAA.
3 Id. The FAA classifies all hijackings as "successful," "incomplete," or "unsuccessful."
A successful hijacking is one in which the hijacker controls the flight and reaches his
"destination or objective." An incomplete hijacking is one in which the "hijacker is apprehended/killed during the hijacking or as a result of 'hot pursuit."' An unsuccessful
hijacking is one in which the hijacker attempts to take control of the flight but fails. FAA,
Office of Air Transportation Security, Hijacking Statistics, Dec. 1, 1972. For the purposes
of this comment, "unsuccessful" and "incomplete" hijackings are treated as one group.
4 Between 1930 and 1967, there were sixty-five attempts; between 1968 and December
31, 1972, there were 329 attempts. Domestic and Foreign Aircraft Hijackings, supra note 1.
5 See Friedlander, Politics, Economics and Skyjacking, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1972, § 10,
at 47, col. 1.
6 See Fenello, Technical Prevention of Air Piracy, 585 INT'L CONCILIATION 28 (1971); U.S.
Dep't of Transportation, News, 69-119, Oct. 15, 1969.
7 See Abramovsky, The Constitutionality of the Anti-Hijacking Security System, 22
BUFFALO L. Rav. 123 (1972); McGinley & Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41 FoRDHAm L. REv. 293 (1972); Note, Airport Security Searches and the
Fourth Amendment, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 1039 (1971); Dershowitz, Stretching the Fourth
Amendment, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1972, § 4, at 2, col. 1.
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to those of alternative measures that may be at least as effective as those
currently in use. The comment concludes that certain aspects of the
present program are both unconstitutional and unwise.
I.

HISTORY

Between July, 1947, and March, 1953, there were sixteen attempted
hijackings,8 fourteen of which succeeded. 9 The successful hijackings all
involved refugees fleeing from Eastern European countries, 10 and the
abrupt halt of such hijackings in 1953 may have been the result of intensified security measures, including travel restrictions, in those
countries." A new series of hijackings began in 1958 and continued
through 1960.12 During this period, there were eleven successful and

five unsuccessful attempts, most of which involved Cubans fleeing from
the Castro regime to the United States.'3 In 1961, the United States
began offering free transportation to persons who gained permission to
leave Cuba,' 4 and perhaps because of this, the Cuba-United States
traffic ended. After 1961, the traffic was reversed. United States-to-Cuba
hijacking attempts, the first of which occurred in that year, 6 reached
their peak in 1968 and 1969.10 Restrictions on travel to Cuba during
the 1960s'7 seem to have been a primary cause of these hijackings.'8
The fourth phase' 9 of hijacking includes recent extortionist hijackings20
8 Domestic and Foreign Aircraft Hijackings, supra note 1.
9 Aggarwala, PoliticalAspects of Hijacking, 585 INTrL CONCILATION 7, 8 (1971).
1o Id.
11 Id.
12 Domestic and Foreign Aircraft Hijackings, supra note 1.
18 PoliticalAspects of Hijacking, supra note 9, at 8-10.
14 45 US. DEm'r OF STATE BULL. 238 (1961). It was originally expected that the flights

would permit twenty thousand Cubans to come to the United States over a period of three
weeks in July and August of 1961. The flights continued, however, until the Cuban missile
crisis in October, 1962. 48 id. 983, at 984 (1963). In 1965, the so-called "Freedom Airlift" was
initiated, bringing Cubans who wanted to leave to Miami. 53 id. 950 (1965). The flights
were recently terminated. Chicago Sun Times, Apr. 7, 1973, at 5, col. 2.
15 See FAA, Office of Air Transportation Security, Chronology of Hijackings of U.S. Registered Aircraft, Dec. 1, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Chronology of U.S. Hijackings].
16 Cuba was the destination of fifty-six of the sixty-two attempted hijackings in 19681969. Between 1970 and 1972, it was the destination in only thirty-six of eighty-five attempted hijackings. Id.; Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Registered Aircraft, supra note 2.
17 45 U.S. DE T OF STATE BuLL. 108 (1961).
18 See HousE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMM. ON INTER-AwMERiCAN Atnms, 90TH
CONG., 2D SEss., AIR PIRACY IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA 2, 7-8 (Comm. Print 1968). The report

suggested that "an alternative mode of transportation may give second thought to those
who may rashly attempt a hijacking operation." Id. at 8.
19 There can be little doubt that the Cuba phase is virtually over. In 1972, of thirty-one
attempted hijackings, only seven were directed to securing passage to Cuba. Hijacking At-

tempts on U.S. Registered Aircraft, supra note 2.
20 There were thirty-five attempts on U.S. aircraft between November 24, 1971, when
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and the hijacking and sabotage of aircraft by terrorists in connection
21
with hostilities in the Middle East.
While the first American hijacking was regarded as a freak,22 the
second, which occurred less than three months later,28 caused an uproar.24 Congress promptly amended the Federal Aviation Act 25 to make
hijacking a federal crime punishable by death, with a minimum sentence of twenty year's imprisonment, 26 and to authorize the airlines to
refuse transportation to passengers who, in the airline's opinion, were
"inimical to safety of flight." 27 Although House and Senate committees
have since held hearings on the subject on several occasions, 28 the 1961
amendments remain the only substantive congressional enactment concerning hijacking. 29 Primary responsibility for dealing with hijacking
has, therefore, devolved upon the Federal Aviation Administration.
Between 1961 and 1967 there were relatively few hijacking attempts,3 0 and the FAA, using its rule making authority, issued only one
minor regulation directed to the problem. 8 ' In 1968, however, a marked
increase in the number of domestic attempts8 2 sparked renewed interest in finding ways to end hijacking.8 3 The State Department announced that it would allow Cuban exiles wanting to return home
to do so, free of charge, on Freedom Airlift return fflights.8 1 A House
subcommittee report on hijacking recommended similar action and
also encouraged the development of electronic and other devices to
"D. B. Cooper" made history as the first parachute extortionist, and December 5, 1972,
when the FAA imposed its strict security regulations, see text at notes 70-72 infra. Of the
thirty-five attempts, twenty-two have been extortionist in nature.' Chronology of U.S. Hijackings. supra note 15.
21 There have been fifteen such hijacking attempts: eight between August, 1969 and
September, 1970; none between September, 1970, and September, 1971; and seven between
September, 1971 and the present. Domestic and Foreign Aircraft Hijackings, supra note 1.
22 See N.Y. Times, May 2, 1961, at 1, col. 6, referring to the affair the day before as
"the Cuban incident" and describing it, not as the first U.S. hijacking, but as a "forced
detour."
23 The first incident occurred on May 1, 1961; the second on July 24. Chronology of U.S.
Hijackings, supra note 15.
24 News related to the incident appeared on the front page of the New York Times for
six consecutive days. In large part, this was due to the Cuban government's position on the
return of the plane. See 45 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE Bu-L. 34, 35-36 (1961). (The passengers
and crew had been allowed to return the day after the hijacking. Id.) Following the Castro
takeover, many of the planes and boats diverted by Cuban refugees fleeing to this country
were attached by court process and sold in satisfaction of debts owed by Cuba to American
citizens. Id. at 275, 277-78; McWhinney, International Legal Problem-Solving and the
PracticalDilemma of Hijacking, in AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 15, 16 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971). The Cubans demanded that a patrol boat be exchanged for the American plane in their custody; the United States complied. 45 U.S. DEF'T OF STATE Bum. 407
(1961). Much of the news, however, concerned recognition of the seriousness of hijacking
and the need for severe penalties. See N.Y. Times, July 29, 1961, at 1, col. 5.
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detect hijackers prior to boarding. 5 In response, the FAA established a
Task Force on the Deterrence of Air Piracy in February, 1969.86
Within a few months, it had developed the "Behavioral Profile," 37

a checklist of about a dozen 88 characteristics of past hijackers. The
Profile, to be used with a magnetometer, a metal sensitive device for
detecting weapons, 9 was designed to help the airlines identify potential
40
hijackers before they boarded the airplane.
25 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1970).
26 Id. § 1472(i).
27 Id. § 1511.
28 See Hearings on the Administration's Emergency Anti-Hijacking Regulations Before
the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93 Cong., 1st Sess. (1973);
Hearing on the Anti-Hijacking Act of 1971 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Hearing on S. 2176 to Implement the
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft and for
Other Purposes Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Hearings on Resolutions Referred to the Comm. on Foreign Affairs Concerning Aircraft Hijacking and Related Matters Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d

Sess. (1970).
29 Congress did pass Pub. L. 91-449, 84 Stat. 921 (May 14, 1970), but this was merely a
technical provision extending jurisdiction to offenses on board aircraft over the high seas, as
required by the Tokyo Convention. See note 216 infra.
30 Between 1961 and 1967, there were twelve attempted hijackings of U.S. registered aircraft; six of the seven successes were directed to Cuba. Chronology of U.S. Hijackings, supra
note 15.
31 See 29 Fed. Reg. 6003 (1964), adopting 14 C.F.R. 40.373, requiring that cockpit doors
be dosed and locked during flight. Regulations prohibiting admission of passengers to the
cockpit had been in effect for some time prior to adoption of this rule and doors with
locks had been required equipment on most airplanes. Many of the comments received
on the proposed rules took the position that locked cockpit doors would not prevent the
taking of hostages. Id.
S2 There were twenty-two attempted hijackings of U.S. registered aircraft in 1968, as
compared with one the year before. Nineteen hundred sixty-eight was a notable year
worldwide: thirty-five hijackings were attempted as compared with six in 1967. Domestic
and Foreign Aircraft Hijacking, supra note 1.
33 Diplomatic negotiations to arrange an extradition agreement with Cuba, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 13, 1969, at 46, col. 1 (editorial), and air transportation boycotts against countries refusing to return hijackers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1969, at 46, col. 4, were both suggested.
House Republicans introduced a bill to require bullet proofing of all pilot cabins on commercial aircraft. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1968, at 33, col. 1.
34 N.Y. Times, July 12, 1968, at 64, col 1.
35 HouSe COMM.ON FOREIGN AFFARS, supra note 18, at 7-8.
36 H. Reighard, Foreword to FAA TASK FORCE ON DETERRENCE OF AIR PIRACY, HIJACK
R nRENcE DATA (1970).
37 See generally J. Dailey, Development of a Behavioral Profile for Air Pirates (paper
prepared for Ninth Annual Law Review Symposium, Villanova Law School) (copy on file at

The University of Chicago Law Review).
38 Fenello, supra note 6, at 30-31.
39 U.S. Dep't of Transportation, News, 69-119, Oct. 15, 1969. See also FAA TASK FORCE
ON DETERRENCE OF AR PIRACY, U.S. EFFORTS To DETER HIJACKING, 15-16 (1970); J. Dailey,
supra note 37, at 8-10.
40 An additional security measure, though short-lived, deserves mention. In response to
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The FAA, recognizing from the outset that the Profile/magnetometer
screening system was imperfect, intended the system primarily as a
deterrent. 41 Its implementation was left to the discretion of the airlines,
most of which did not use it at first due to fear of adverse reaction from
the travelling public. 4 2 Eastern Airlines, which prior to mid-1969 had
suffered most from hijacking,43 became the first airline to test the new
system.4 4 At the check-in counter, ticket agents identified passengers
fitting the Profile as "selectees," giving them color-coded boarding
passes. All passengers were required to walk through the magnetometer
prior to boarding, but only Profile selectees who activated the magthe hijacking and destruction of three jets at a remote desert strip in Jordan in early
September, 1970, President Nixon hastily announced that armed incognito agents would

ride airlines flying routes that had proved most vulnerable to hijacking. White House Press
Release, Sept. 11, 1970, 63 U.S. DE'r OF STATE BuLL. 341 (1970). The Department of Transportation had previously offered guard protection at the request of an air carrier. Statement of John A. Volpe, Secretary of Commerce, Hearings on S. 4383 Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 2d Seas. (1970). These guards were vested with law enforcement powers through designation by the attorney general as deputy U.S. marshals. Id.
President Nixon's plan would have utilized such guards-there were then about 1300immediately, supplemented by specially trained members of the armed forces, while an
adequate civilian force was being trained. White House Press Release, supra. The Department of Transportation hoped to train and employ 2,500 new guards, at a cost of $28 million, to carry out the program. Statement of John A. Volpe, supra. Ultimately, the "sky
marshal" program failed because Congress did not vote the necessary funds. A bill passed
the House providing for the temporary expenditure of funds from the Airport and Airways Trust Fund. H.R. 19444, 91st Cong., 2d Seas. (1970). The Senate Finance Committee,
however, never reported this bill, nor did it report a similar Senate bill, S. 4383, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970), authorizing the secretary of transportation to provide guards for commercial aircraft and funding the measure by an increase in the domestic airway ticket tax.
The proposal was controversial; in hearings before the full House Committee on Foreign
Affairs the plan was attacked as impractical, ineffectual, and a threat to the safety of
passengers. See Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 28, at
95-97, 130. Though there had been instances in which armed guards on an El Al airplane
and a Brinks guard on a TWA jet shot hijackers, thus preventing diversion of the flight,
even those in favor of the sky marshal plan realized that it was at best a temporary solution
which would not work if a hijacker succeeded in using a hostage as a shield and could
result in a mid-air shoot out that would be more hazardous than compliance with the
hijacker's demands. Id. at 132. Moreover, the president's plan would have covered only a
fraction of the fourteen thousand daily flights of US. aircraft. Thus, the possibility still
remained that hijackers would simply divert their efforts to routes that did not appear to
be vulnerable, but that were nonetheless served by jets with long-range capabilities.
41 FAA TASK FORCE ON DETERRENCE OF ATR PIRAcY, U.S. EFFoRTs To DEm HIJACKING 20
(1970); Fenello, supra note 6, at 28-30; U.S. Dep't of Transportation, News, 69-135, Dec. 10,
1969, at 3; cf. J. Dailey, supra note 37, at 11, observing that, although the greatest benefit
from the system in the early stages would be deterrence, the system could become "a positive prevention measure" if coverage became "substantial or even complete."
42 Fenello, supra note 6, at 29.
43 Eastern had been the victim of eighteen of sixty-seven domestic hijacking attempts
between 1961 and September, 1969, and twelve of thirty-four attempts in the first nine
months of 1969. Chronology of US. Hijackings, supra note 15.
44 U.S. Dep't of Transportation, News, 69-119, Oct. 15, 1969; Fenello, supra note 6, at 29.
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netometer were detained. If the persons detained failed to present
identification and explain the activation of the magnetometer, they
were subjected to a "pat-down" search and arrested if violations of
the law were detected. 45
Despite the dramatic hijacking and subsequent destruction of three
large aircraft in September, 1970,40 implementation of the FAA's Profile/magnetometer screening system continued to be voluntary. The
system seemed to work well where used, 4" and FAA Administrator
John Shafer claimed that no flight had been hijacked after passengers
had been screened. 48 The reason for this soon became clear: since the
system was used only on routes considered particularly vulnerable to
diversion due to their proximity to Cuba, hijackers began focusing
their attention on other flights49 and diverting flights to destinations
other than Cuba.5 0 Each route's vulnerability to hijacking became less
a function of its proximity to Cuba and more a function of whether it
was served by a jet.51
45 According to Mr. Fenello, where an identification check was made for one passenger,
"at least one or two additional passengers" were also stopped. This procedure, it was hoped,
would protect the secrecy of the Profile, and "keep any passenger from interpreting the
airline's action as being discriminatory due to race, color, or creed, factors which are not a
part of the basic profile." Fenello, supra note 6, at 31.
46 N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 4; Washington Post, Sept. 8, 1970, at A-1, col. 6;
see note 40 supra.
47 From October, 1969, through December, 1971, Eastern Airlines experienced only nine
hijacking attempts (one of which, that of March 17, 1970, was considered only by the Justice Department, not the FAA, as an attempt), as compared with twelve attempts in the
first nine months of 1969. Chronology of U.S. Hijackings, supra note 15; see note 44 supra.
Eastern considered the system a "continuing success in hijack prevention." Fenello, supra
note 6, at 33. In December, 1969, TWA became the second carrier to use the Profile/
magnetometer system, U.S. Dep't of Transportation, News, 69-135, Dec. 10, 1969, and Pan
American joined in January, 1970, U.S. Dep't of Transportation, News, 70-41, May 6,
1970 at 2. By the end of 1971, all United States commercial carriers were using at major
terminals a security system based entirely or in part on the FAA program. Fenello, supra
note 6, at 30.
48 U.S. Dep't of Transportation, News, 70-57, June 15, 1970, at 2.
49 Chronology of U.S. Hijackings, supra note 15. In the fifteen months between October,
1970, and January, 1972, there were thirty-six attempted hijackings of United States commerial airliners; twenty-five of these occurred on routes originating from or bound for
cities other than those in Florida or Puerto Rico and twenty-one occurred on flights wholly
outside the southeastern United States. Id.
50 In 1969, thirty-seven of the forty attempted hijackings of United States commercial
aircraft were aimed at securing passage to Cuba. In 1970, in at least nine of the twentyseven attempted hijackings the hijacker announced a destination other than Cuba. In 1971,
this figure rose to thirteen, while the number of attempts remained constant. And in 1972,
twenty-five of thirty-one hijackings had some objective other than Cuba. Id.
51 No route served by a jet was immune to the threat of diversion. In the last quarter
of 1971, for example, routes as diverse as Anchorage-to-Bethel, Portland-to-Seattle, and
Albuquerque-to-Chicago were the target of hijack attempts; these attempts were, respectively, incomplete to Cuba, a successful parachute extortion, and successful to Cuba. Id.
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In a notice of proposed rule making in September, 1971, Administrator Shafer observed that the voluntary screening program was not
providing the "needed protection in many instances." 52 He proposed
that all air carriers, within ninety days of the effective date of the
proposal, submit a security program to prevent hijacking of its airplanes.5 3 Between September, when this proposal was issued, and January, 1972, there were thirteen attempted hijackings, five of which
succeeded.5 4 Of the eight unsuccessful hijackings, six involved extortion demands and four of those included requests for parachutes."
Because of this "alarming" increase in hijacking, "including extortion
57
of large sums of money,"t5 6 the FAA issued an emergency regulation
on January 31, 1972, requiring all air carriers, before February 6, 1972,
to "adopt and put into use a screening system, acceptable to the Administrator, to prevent or deter the carriage aboard its aircraft of any
sabotage device or weapon in carry-on baggage or on or about the per....,,8 In the order, Administrator Shafer observed
sons of passengers
that the Profile/magnetometer screening system had been effective
where used and, in the opinion of the FAA, could have prevented "a
majority of the air piracies occurring recently" had it been used to the
9 But since the regulation did not specify what
fullest possible extent.Y
52 36 Fed. Reg. 19173 (1971).
53 Id.

54 Chronology of U.S. Hijackings, supra note 15. Of these five, one was the famous "D. B.
Cooper" parachute extortion affair. Actually, Cooper was not the pioneer he was widely
thought to be. He was not the first to attempt to extort money- on June 4, 1970, an American, Arthur B. Barkley, had demanded that he be paid $100,000 in ransom. Nor was Cooper
the first to attempt to make a parachute getaway; a Scot named Paul J. Cini tried and was
captured when he put down his gun to strap on his parachute on an Air Canada flight
over Alberta, about two weeks before Cooper's exploit. But Cooper received the most publicity, probably because of his successful use of the parachute. Within a short time after
Cooper's jump there was a popular song praising his exploits, "D. B. Cooper" sweatshirts
flooded the market, and a bowling alley in Seattle offered a "D, B. Cooper Bowling Sweepstakes" with cash prizes. The Skyjacker and How to Stop Him, SATURDAY REvMEW, Aug. 26,
1972, at 46. For a discussion of the faddish effect of the Cooper affair, see note 69 infra.
55 Chronology of U.S. Hijackings, supra note 15.
56 37 Fed. Reg. 2500, 2501 (1972).
57 Id.

58 Id. at 2501 (emphasis added).
59 Id. Despite Mr. Shafer's confidence in the screening system and the authority, conferred on him by the "acceptable to the Administrator" language of the January 81 order,
to require airlines to employ it on every flight, the FAA's policy following the order was,
until December 5, 1972: "to require as a minimum use of the Profile .... Air carriers that
had detection devices were required to use them to the maximum extent of their availability. The minimum use of both Profile and detection device was required on certain designated flights which were considered to be more susceptible to aerial piracy than others."
Letter from V.L. Krohn, Chief, Operations Liaison Staff, Office of Air Transportation Security, FAA, to The University of Chicago Law Review, Feb. 5, 1973. Thus, the FAA never
ordered total screening on all flights. Only vulnerable routes were covered by the system;
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type of screening system would be "acceptable to the Administrator," its
real import lay in the power that it gave the administrator to review the
airlines' security plans and order changes summarily.60 Thus, for the first
time, the antihijacking procedures used by the airlines were brought
under the direct control of the FAA.
In the nine week period from March to early May, 1972, and again
in June and July, 1972, more hijackings occurred,6 ' most of them
extortion attempts. 62 The FAA responded in June by proposing that
aircraft with ventral or tail cone exits be modified so that the exits
could not be opened in flight.63 This proposal was not approved until
November and compliance was not required before August, 1973.64
However, by August, 1972, extortion hijackings had abated. 5 Apparently nothing fails like failure, and in extortion hijackings, everyone,
with one possible exception, 66 had failed. 67 The airlines have been
closing tail exits during scheduled maintenance periods, 3 and the paraon other routes, screening remained essentially voluntary. But the vulnerable route theory
had proved vulnerable itself in the months following the president's 1970 message. By the
end of 1971, all major airlines were using the Profile/magnetometer system on the routes
they considered most vulnerable; yet hijackers simply turned to other routes. Because of
the continuing incidence of hijacking, the FAA had found it necessary to act in September,
1971, and again the following January to require all airlines to develop and implement a
security system "acceptable to the Administrator." Interpreting this language as merely
requiring the securing of vulnerable routes meant, in essence, that nothing had changed.
60 The notice stated that further rule making action would be taken shortly to implement the balance of the September proposal, which gave the administrator the power to
order changes in a carrier's security plan on his own initiative where he found that "safety
in air transportation and the public interest" so required. 36 Fed. Reg. 19174 (1971). The
amendment provision was adopted at the end of February in an emergency rule making
action implementing the earlier September proposal in full. 37 Fed. Reg. 4904 (1972). The
amendment provision is significant because it is the authority relied on by the FAA for the
increased security measures ordered on December 5, 1972. Telegram from FAA to all FAA
Regional Directors, Dec. 5, 1972, copy on file at The University of Chicago Law Review.
61 In 1972 there were eleven attempts between March 7 and May 5 and eleven more
between June 2 and July 31. Chronology of U.S. Hijackings, supra note 15.
62 Four of the March-May group and nine of the June-July group were extortions. Id.
63 37 Fed. Reg. 12507 (1972).
64 37 Fed. Reg. 25354-55 (1972).
65 There have been only three hijack attempts since July 31, 1972-on August 18, October 29, and November 10, 1972. The August and November attempts included demands
for money. Chronology of U.S. Hijacking, supra note 15.
06 Cooper succeeded in jumping out of the aircraft over some very rough country in
southern Washington. However, none of the marked money he had with him was ever
recovered, prompting speculation that he may have died during or shortly after his jump.
The Skyjacker and How to Stop Him, supra note 54, at 51.
67 Only six hijackers had even succeeded in jumping out of the aircraft, although fifteen
had demanded that parachutes be brought on board. Chronology of U.S. Hijackings, supra
note 15.
68 Letter from V.L. Krohn, supra note 59.
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chute gambit seems to have become a short-lived, though colorful,
episode in hijacking history.
The last five months of 1972 witnessed only three attempted hijackings of United States-registered aircraft, 69 fewer than in any comparable
period since 1967. Nonetheless, in December, 1972, the FAA issued its
most far-reaching order,1 0 apparently in response to two dramatic and
violent hijackings in October and early November.7 ' The order, effec69 Chronology of U.S. Hijackings, supra note 15. Though U.S. hijacking attempts actually increased in 1972, see Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Registered Aircraft, supra note 2,
this statistic is misleading. The following table shows United States and foreign hijacking
attempts from August through December for the last five years:

U.S. Attempts
Foreign Attempts

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

3
13

10
16

15
21

13
28

12
8

Chronology of U.S. Hijackings, supra note 15; Domestic and Foreign Aircraft Hijackings,
supra note 1. Though both the U.S. and foreign nations experienced "peaks" in 1969 and
1970, the domestic decline has been more precipitous than the foreign decline.
For purposes of long-term comparisons, utilization of the August-December figures is
appropriate if the January-July, 1972, period is viewed as an unusual one during which
hijackers attempted to try out the "new" extortion gambit pioneered (with parachute) by
"Cooper." See text and note at note 54 supra. This view seems justified by comparing U.S.
and foreign attempts during January-July over the last five years:

U.S. Attempts
Foreign Attempts

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

28
19

17
16

13
34

27
19

10
5

Chronology of the U.S. Hijackings, supra note 15. The U.S. activity in January-July,
1972, seems dearly out of step with both U.S. and foreign trends.
Given these figures, a strong argument can be made that, had it not been for the faddish
interest in extortions following the Cooper affair, see text and notes at notes 20, 61-62,
the number of attempts in 1972 would have been very small indeed. This in turn indicates
that the FAA's Profile/magnetometer system, even though applied only on a voluntary
basis by the airlines, was quite effective as a deterrent.
70 U.S. Dep't of Transportation, News, 103-72, Dec. 5, 1972.
71 Chronology of U.S. Hijackings, supra note 15. On October 29, 1972, four men wanted
in connection with a bank robbery in Virginia forced their way onto a jet in Houston
and diverted it to Cuba. In the process of boarding the plane, they shot and killed a
ticket agent, and wounded a ramp serviceman. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
On November 10, 1972, three men-two of whom were wanted on rape charges and one
of whom was a fugitive from jail-boarded a Southern Airways jet in Birmingham,
Alabama, and diverted it to Cuba. The drama lasted twenty-nine hours, during which time
the jet, with all passengers aboard, shuttled four thousand miles up and down the eastern
United States, landing at eight airports, one of which was Havana, before finally landing
at Havana again. The co-pilot was wounded in the arm, either by the hijackers or by the
FBI, who shot out the plane's tires in Orlando. The hijackers demanded $10 million in
ransom and were paid over $2 million, which was confiscated, but later returned, by
authorities in Havana. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1972, at 1, col. 1; see note 183 infra.
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tive January 5, 1973, requires electronic screening of all passengers as
a condition of boarding, and inspection by the airlines of all carry-on
items accessible to passengers during flight.7 2 In a related action, the
FAA also required airport operators to provide, by February 6, 1973,
armed law enforcement officers at all boarding gates during the boarding process.73 This rule went into effect on February 16, after an at74
tempt to have it permanently enjoined had failed.
The government's response to hijacking has been sporadic and not
always well advised. The initial decision to study ways of thwarting
hijackers and the decision to seal tail exits to prevent parachute hijackings seem clearly appropriate. In other cases, the response has been
questionable.7 5 Between 1968 and 1972 the FAA clung to the vulnerable route theory,76 even though hijacker objectives and destinations
had changed markedly during that time. And, although it clearly had
the power to do so, 77 the FAA never required limited Profile/magnetometer screening on all flights. Instead, it moved from a system that
remained largely voluntary prior to December, 1972, to a system of
total security-suddenly requiring armed guards and searches of carryon luggage at a time when hijacking was at its lowest ebb in five years.
II.

THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AIRPORT SEARciHs

Airport searches raise two distinct types of constitutional problems:
first, whether and in what circumstances airport searches are permissible under the fourth amendment; and second, whether airport
searches place constitutionally permissible conditions upon the exercise of the right to travel.
72 U.S. Dep't of Transportation, News 103-72, Dec. 5, 1972. As a result of the electronic
screening requirement, Eastern Airlines has stopped using the Profile altogether. Letter

of Michael J. Fenello, Vice President, Operational Coordination, Eastern Airlines, to
The University of Chicago Law Review, Mar. 7, 1973. For the implications of this policy,
see text and notes at notes 149-151 infra.
73 37 Fed. Reg. 25934 (1972).
74 Airport Operators Council Int'l v. Shafer, 354 F. Supp. 79 (D.D.C. 1973).
75 See discussion of President Nixon's sky-marshal program, note 40 supra.
76 See note 59 supra.
77 The power was vested by virtue of the "acceptable to the Administrator" language of
the January 31, 1972 order, see text at note 58 supra, and the amendment provisions that
followed in late February, see text at note 60 supra.
78 The fourth amendment of the Constitution provides: "The Right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized."
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A.

Fourth Amendment

8

Problems

In Terry v. Ohio,79 Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court,
observed that the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures guarantees to the citizen an "inestimable
right of personal security," which "belongs as much to the citizen on
the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to
dispose of his secret affairs."8 0 To ensure that this right of personal
security is respected by law enforcement officials, courts have developed
a rule requiring the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the
fourth amendment."' With few exceptions, a warrant issued by an
impartial third party, usually a judge or magistrate, on the basis of
facts sufficient to support an independent finding of probable cause, is
required as a condition to the intrusion upon the privacy of an individual's person or possessions.8 2
The Supreme Court has, in practice, determined the reasonableness
of a search by looking both to the extent of the intrusion into the
privacy of the individual and to the extent of the harm that has necessitated the search. In Katz v. United States,8 3 the Court stated that "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," and drew a distinction
between "what a person knowingly exposes to the public" and "what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public."8 4 Yet, where the Court has carved out exceptions to the general
fourth amendment rule against warrantless searches, it has found
justification in particular exigencies that render the usually strong
interest in protecting individual privacy subordinate to the general
societal interest in avoiding undue risk of serious harm. 5
There are three traditional exceptions to the rule against warrant79 892 U.S. 1 (1968).
80 Id. at 8-9.
81 The Court first applied the rule to evidence seized by federal officers in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court extended
the exclusionary rule to the states.
82 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
83 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
84 Id. at 351-52.
85 See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949) (search of motor vehicle where there is "substantial ground" to believe crime
is being or has been committed); Cooper v. California, 386 US. 58 (1967) (search of an
impounded vehicle pursuant to statute pending forfeiture proceedings where the search
is closely related to the reason for the arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
(search of premises while in "hot pursuit" of suspected felon where suspect had been
observed entering the house); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972) (electronic surveillance authorized by the attorney general in cases of foreign

espionage).
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less searches. Searches made incident to a lawful arrest have been
upheld regardless of the absence of a search warrant 6 since, in such
cases, there is an immediate need to discover potentially harmful
objects in the vicinity of the arrestee and to recover evidence that might
easily be destroyed. The arrest, however, cannot be made without
probable cause, and such cause may not be demonstrated from evidence
7
subsequently seized.
An individual may also be searched without a warrant if he consents
to the search."" The consent must be voluntarily and intelligently
given and may not be the result of coercion or duress, actual or implied. 9 Thus, in Cipres v. United States,9 0 the Ninth Circuit said:
"Such a waiver cannot be conclusively presumed from a verbal expression of assent. The court must determine... whether the verbal assent
reflected an... unequivocal election to grant the officer a license which
the person knows may be freely and effectively withheld."91
The third exception to the warrant requirement was announced by
the Court in Terry. Stating that a police officer may, in the course of
his duty to investigate possible criminal behavior, approach a person
for questioning even though probable cause to make an arrest does not
exist, the Court held that, when the officer is "justified in believing
that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at
close range is armed and presently dangerous," he may make a limited
search of the person, "confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably
designed to discover" hidden weapons. 92 The Terry exception was,
according to the Court, necessary to minimize the risk of harm to
police officers in the performance of their investigative duties. 93
In addition to the incident-to-arrest, consent, and stop-and-frisk exceptions, there are two other less common exceptions: border searches
by customs officials, and administrative searches made pursuant to a
86 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339

U.S. 56 (1950); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 669 (1948); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947); cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
87 "It is axiomatic that an incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part
of its justification." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968).
88 Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946); cf. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964);
United States v. Como, 840 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 903 (1963).
89 See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d
95 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Como, 340 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v.
Smith, 308 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963); United States v. Bell,
335 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
90 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965).
91 Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
92 392 U.S. 1, 4, 27, 29 (1968).
93 Id. at 23-24.
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state's police power. In 1789, Congress authorized customs officials "to
enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any
goods... subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for,
seize, and secure any such goods .... "94 While the statute clearly did
not require anything like probable cause, it did require some degree
of suspicion. In the statute currently authorizing customs searches this
requirement has been retained.95 Various rationales have been offered
to distinguish border searches from searches in other contexts;9 6 nonetheless, the courts have held the fourth amendment applicable to
border search cases. As the Ninth Circuit observed, paraphrasing the
Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,7 "[t]he word '[border]' is not a talisman in whose presence the fourth amendment fades
away and disappears." ' s In United States v. Glaziou9 9 although customs officials were held privileged to conduct searches on a "mere
suspicion of possible illegal activity within their jurisdiction,"'10 0 the
court added that "border stops and searches, like all stops and searches
by public officials, are restricted by the requirement that they be
reasonable . . ." in the circumstances of each case. 101 Generally, the
courts in border search cases have required an increasing degree of
10 2
suspicion as the search becomes more intrusive.
94 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43 (emphasis added).

95 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970): "Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search
vessels may stop, search, and examine ... any vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom
he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have been
introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to Law ..."
96 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886), suggesting that in such a case the
government is only searching for what rightfully belongs to it, and that, since the act
permitting border searches was passed by the Congress that proposed the Bill of Rights,
"it is clear that the members of that body did not regard search and seizure of this kind as
'unreasonable' and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment."
One commentator has observed that "the long-standing congressional approval of search
of vessels without warrant sanctioned only a hunt for goods entering the United States on
which duty had not been paid, not for evidence to be seized domestically for use in a
criminal prosecution. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPRME CoURT: A STUDY
IN CoNsTrrIUIONAL INTERPRETATION 90 (1966). Whatever the historical validity of this remark,
it is contrary to the current statute, which directs an officer who discovers contraband to
"seize and secure the same for trial." 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
07 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971), holding that stops of automobiles must be supported by
specific and articulable facts.
98 United States v. Petersen, No. 72-2133, at 5 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 1973).
99 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968).
100 Id. at 12.
101 Id. at 12-13.
102 Thus, in United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1970), the
court held that "compelling reasons" must appear to justify a strip search. And in
Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 377-78 (9th Cir. 1969), the court held that there
must be at least a real suspicion directed specifically to the person crossing the border for
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In Camarav. Municipal Court'03 and See v. Seattle,10 4 the Supreme
Court found that housing code enforcement searches do not fit any of
the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement. It held, therefore, that such searches, when made without warrants, are unreasonable, despite the minimal demands they made upon residents. The
Court stated, however, that the probable cause needed to support a
code-enforcement warrant need not depend on information particular
to each dwelling, but could be based on the agency's appraisal of
conditions in an area as a whole, and acknowledged that such warrants
need only be sought after the inspector, in nonemergency situations,
had attempted to gain entry but had been refused. 0 5
In carving out exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches,
the Court has consistently attempted to ensure that the individual's interest in privacy remains protected. Even in border search cases, where
a lesser standard than probable cause is sufficient to justify some
searching, the individual's interest in privacy has been safeguarded by
requiring increasing justification as the search becomes more intrusive.
1. The Profile. The "Behavioral Profile," developed in 1969 by the
psychology staff of the FAA's Office of Aviation Medicine on the basis
of the backgrounds and behavioral characteristics of persons who had
attempted hijackings, is a checklist of at least a dozen traits aimed at
selecting potential hijackers for further investigation. 0 6 It cannot be
an examination of body cavities to comply with the fourth amendment proscription
against unreasonable searches. Cf. United States v. Petersen, No. 72-2123 (9th Cir. Jan.
18, 1973); United States v. Wel, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1970); Alexander v. United States,
362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966), all three of which set forth a standard of "reasonable
certainty" that a smuggling offense has taken place where customs agents or other law
enforcement persons stop and search a person or vehicle that has recently entered the
country and is outside the immediate vicinity of the border area.
103 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
104 387 US. 541 (1967).
105 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967).

106 See J. Dailey, supra note 37. Field trials were made in nine cities prior to Eastern
Airlines' implementation of the Profile/magnetometer search system in October, 1969.
U.S. Dep't of Transportation, News, 69-119, Oct. 15, 1969, at 2. The airlines and the FAA
have attempted to keep the contents of the Profile secret, and federal judges, to date, have
assisted them. See United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Lopez,

328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), both of which approved disclosure of the elements of
the Profile in an in camera proceeding from which the defendant was excluded but in
which his counsel was permitted to participate. But see United States v. Clark, No. 72-2147
(2d Cir. Mar. 8, 1973), holding it an unconstitutional denial of a defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation to exclude him from any part of a suppression hearing except
that which specifically involved disclosure of elements of the Profile. Nonetheless, some of
the details have been publicized, and it is doubtful that the remainder can be guarded
indefinitely. One columnist states that the Profile identifies males, between the ages of
fifteen and fifty-five, who are traveling alone, purchase a one-way ticket, and pay in cash.
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argued that application of the Profile intrudes, in the usual fourth
amendment sense, upon the normally expected privacy of the individual: 10 7 its use does not involve restraint of the individual, and it
measures only those characteristics that the traveler has exposed either
to general public view or to the airline when he purchases a ticket.
The constitutional question presented by use of the Profile is, instead,
whether it can be used to support a finding of probable cause to search
a traveler or to justify a more limited intrusion-scanning with a magnetometer.
In Terry v. Ohio, 1 the Supreme Court authorized a stop when there
are "specific and articulable facts" sufficient to support a reasonable
belief that the action is warranted, 09 and held a frisk of the suspect
permissible when the officer could reasonably believe that the suspect
was armed and presently dangerous. 110 Because of its unreliability, the
Profile cannot be said to provide specific and articulable facts indicating that a selectee is a hijacker. Although the Profile is revised when
new data become available,"' there have only been 159 attempted hijackings of United States aircraft, 11 2 involving only 218 individuals;"13
many hijackers are currently fugitives in other lands, some were killed,
others used aliases and their true identities remain unknown. 114 It
Killian, Profile of a Potential Skyjacker, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 3, 1972, § 1-A, at 5 col. 3.
See also United States v. Riggs, No. 72-2181 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 1973), indicating that the
Profile was met by the defendant, a young black female accompanied by two males, who
were wearing "a brilliant orange coat and carrying no luggage," and who bought three
one-way tickets for which she paid cash produced from a brown paper bag.
In fact, the Profile is a method of exclusion of passengers as hijacker suspects; it is used
to clear individuals wishing to board airplanes. As developed, the elements of the Profile
were kept simple and a passenger would have to fit all of them to be considered a suspect.
But the FAA claimed to have a large number of characteristics "in reserve" that could be
added to the Profile, in which case a passenger might not have to meet all the elements to
become a suspect. FAA TAsK FORCE ON DETEMNCZ OF Ant PIRACY, U.S. EFFORTS TO DETER

IJACKINGs 28-31 (1970).
107 Note, supra note 7, at 1052.
108 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
109 392 U.S. at 21-22. The facts are to be measured against an objective, reasonable
man standard, not by the subjective impressions of the particular officer: "Anything less
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more
substantial than inarticulate hunches ... ." Id.
110 Id. at 24.
111 See J. Dailey, supra note 37.
112 Chronology of US. Hijackings, supra note 15.
113 Id.; Lindsey, 218 Persons Involved in 159 U.S. Hijackings Since 1961, FAA Says, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 16, 1972, at 3, col. 1.
114 The FAA reports that, of the 218 persons involved in 159 domestic hijackings, 124
are fugitives, forty-four were convicted in the United States, five were convicted abroad,
four were acquitted, charges against fifteen were dropped, five were killed during the
attempt, three committed suidde, and sixteen are in mental institutions. Cases are pending
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seems highly unlikely that a statistically reliable list of a dozen characteristics could be distilled from such a limited sample."I5 Even if such
a list could be devised, the circumstances of its application cast additional doubts on its reliability. Airline agents, who lack special training"1 6 and apply the Profile at ticket counters and boarding gates, have
only a brief opportunity to observe passengers and must perform other
duties at the same time. 11 1In these circumstances, the Profile seems no
more likely to identify hijackers or other criminals than a mere random
selection of 0.5 percent of all air travelers-the percentage selected by
the Profile. 118 In United States v. Lopez,119 Judge Weinstein noted
that, of those passengers who fit the Profile, only about one-third, or 0.1
percent of all passengers, "fail" the magnetometer, cannot satisfy the
U.S. Marshal's interrogation, and are frisked.120 Of those frisked, a
weapon is found in about 6 percent of the cases. 121 Thus, only about 2
percent of the Profile-selectees-0.01 percent of all passengers-turn
out to possess a weapon. At this rather low degree of specificity, it
against the remainder. Lindsey, supra note 113. For an individual accounting, see FAA,
Office of Air Transportation Security, Current Legal Status of Hijackers, Dec. 1, 1972.
115 In order to predict at a high level of certainty the effect on one dependent variable
(hijacking) of variation in one independent variable requires approximately thirty observations. M. EzEKIEL, METHODS OF CORRELATION ANALYSIS 22 (2d ed. 1941). Approximately
100 observations are required to estimate the effect of two independent variables, id. at
186, and the number of observations required to maintain the same degree of certainty
increases logarithmically with the addition of further independent variables. Since no
more than 218 hijackers could have been observed for the sample, see note 114 supra, and
the Profile allegedly contains more than twelve independent variables, see text and notes
at notes 88, 106 supra, the predictive ability of the Profile is miniscule.
There probably is some predictive value in the Profile, however. Many of the variables
are undoubtedly covariate, so there are fewer than twelve effective variables. Each variable
has a limited range of values (sex, for example, has only two), further reducing the error.
Finally, the sample of "hijackers" is not a random cross section of "air travelers," and
selectivity in the sample can increase the predictive effect. Even these three factors do not
make the Profile highly reliable, however. It seems safe to assert that, since selectees are a
small subset of travelers, and most travelers are nonhijackers, and the Profile is not highly
reliable, most hijackers are not selectees and the vast majority of selectees are not hijackers.
116 Airline personnel working in terminals were simply trained to be aware of the elements of the Profile. At Eastern Airlines they were themselves screened for any personality
traits that might work against their impartial application of the Profile. Fenello, supra
note 6, at 31.
117 The difficulty of applying the Profile objectively is compounded by the fact that,
for security purposes, its details are never written down, but are passed on orally from
supervisor to agent. Id.; see SENATE COMM. ON COMIMERCE, REPORT ON S. 39, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 8, 9 (Comm. Print 1973), expressing reservations as to the ability of airline employees
to effectively and objectively apply the Profile.
118 Fenello, supra note 6, at 31.
119 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
120 Id. at 1084, 1097.
121 Id.
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seems logical to expect that, after magnetometer screening and interrogation by the marshal, 2 percent of random selectees would also possess
a weapon. In fact, the Profile has thus far proved more proficient at
selecting persons carrying illegal drugs than it has at identifying possi122
ble hijackers.
In Lopez, Judge Weinstein argued that the Profile/magnetometer
in combination was sufficiently reliable to justify questioning and, if
necessary, a frisk for weapons. Attention was focused not on the validity of the Profile itself, but rather on the frisk that resulted when the
Profile, magnetometer, and questioning by a law enforcement officer
combined to raise suspicion as to a particular individual. Noting the
statistics cited above and observing that only a miniscule percentage
of passengers are detained for questioning, the court balanced the
limited nature of a frisk against the harm of hijacking: "In light of the
circumstances, a 6% danger of arms [among those frisked] sufficed to
justify a frisk."' 23 The court added that the "procedure, as designed,
operates on purely objective criteria independent of race, color, or
24
creed."'
The opinion in Lopez, 125 assumes that a 6 percent likelihood of
finding weapons on those frisked is sufficient, given the exigencies of
hijacking, to justify the intrusion. But this assumption is vitiated if a
122 See Air Piracy Scoreboard (January, 1973), enclosed with Letter from V.L. Krohn,
supra note 59, indicating that nearly twice as many arrests have been made for drug offenses as for weapons offenses. During a twenty-two month period through the fall of
1972, weapons offenses accounted for less than 20 percent of all airport arrests, drug arrests amounted to about one-third, and the balance was for illegal entry and other crimes.
Lindsey, Skyjacking Screening Cuts Other Arrests at Airports, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1973,
§ 5, at 25, col. 6. The article stated that since mandatory screening began in January, 1973,
the number of airport arrests has declined.
123 328 F. Supp. at 1097. The particular circumstances to which Judge Weinstein was
referring appear to be the prevalence and nature of hijacking:
Mere statistical information such as that generated in this case does not, by itself,
justify "frisks." If, for example, reliable statistics were available that in a given
community one person in fifteen (6%) regularly carried concealed weapons the
police would not be justified in arbitrarily stopping and frisking anyone on the
street. Such harassment by police without more objective evidence of criminal activity or a legitimate investigative purpose is proscribed by the Fourth Amendment....
The Court is charged with balancing the competing interests of the individual and the society in each case presented.
Id. at 1097-98.
124 Id. at 1097.
125 Unfortunately, the opinion is entirely dicta, since the court found that the airline
employee, in applying the Profile to the defendant, had eliminated one criterion from the
official FAA Profile and included two additional categories. One of the characteristics added
introduced an ethnic element for which there was no experimental basis and the second
"called for an act of individual judgment" by the employee, thus destroying what the
court termed "the essential neutrality and objectivity of the approved profile," and rendering the screening unconstitutional. Id. at 1101.
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frisk of a random selection of 0.1 percent of all passengers-the percentage selected by the screening system to be frisked-produces comparable results. In addition, the decision that the Profile/magnetometer
combination satisfies the Terry test of specific-and-articulable facts
assumes, implicitly, a crucial step in the search procedure-that the
Profile justifies the intrusion inherent in the magnetometer scan. Prior
to the promulgation of the FAA's December rules, all passengers were
required to walk through the magnetometer, but only Profile selectees
were stopped upon activation of the device. If the magnetometer is
itself a stop, it is justifiable only if the Profile satisfies the specific-andarticulable facts standard of Terry.
Terry requires, however, only that the specific, articulable facts,
"taken together with rational inferences from those facts," reasonably
warrant the actual intrusion made. 126 If, therefore, magnetometer
screening can be considered less intrusive than the investigative stop
in Terry, the facts necessary to justify it may be less specific and articulable than those necessary to justify a stop. 127 In Terry, the officer who
made the stop was a veteran policeman, experienced in investigating
criminal behavior; when he stopped the suspects, he had a particularized notion of the criminal actions in which they might be engaging. 128
The FAA, in contrast, regarded the apprehension of drug offenders
that resulted from applying the Profile as an unexpected bonus. 129 Of
course, if, because of the small percentage of selectees who have been
found to possess weapons or other hijacking tools, the Profile qualifies
as a showing of specific and articulable facts, then the unexpected drug
offender dividend does not make use of the Profile improper.
It seems appropriate to conclude that the magnetometer is not a
stop; it is a more limited step in the ascending chain of justification
leading to a Terry-type stop-and-frisk. If, however, the magnetometer
is a search, however limited, it must have its own justification. Though
the Profile does not support a finding of probable cause, or even
specific-and-articulable facts justifying a stop, it may give rise to a
suspicion sufficient to justify the limited intrusion that magnetometer
scanning entails.
2. The Magnetometer. The magnetometer is an electronic device
126

592 US. at 21.

"Because one variable is the degree of imposition on the individual . . . less evidence is needed ... when the consequences for the individual are less serious." LaFave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MIcE. L.
REy. 40, 54 (1968).
128 392 U.S. at 23.
129 U.S. Dep't of Transportation, News, 70-41, May 6, 1970, at 1.
127
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that can be tuned to detect various amounts of ferrous metal. 13 0 It
cannot, however, distinguish between a concealed weapon and an "innocent" iron or steel item of like mass, nor can it detect weapons made
from metal alloys that do not disturb the earth's gravitational field.131
The largest manufacturer of the devices recommends that, for optimum
utility, they be tuned to detect an amount of ferrous metal equivalent
to that in a .32 caliber handgun. 1 32 Since half of all air travelers normally carry this much ferrous metal'3 3 they are identified by the
magnetometer as potential carriers of .32 caliber (or larger) weapons.
While the magnetometer does not involve any physical intrusion
upon the individual or his property, it nonetheless constitutes a search
in the constitutional sense. In Katz v. United States,134 the Supreme
Court rejected the government's contention that placing an electronic
listening device on the outside of a public phone booth was not violative
of the fourth amendment, and overruled two former cases holding that
only physical considerations were relevant to the invasion of privacy
135
question.
The bugging device in Katz and the magnetometer differ in the
extent of the intrusion upon the individual's privacy. The magnetometer involves a minimal intrusion, since the traveler must simply walk through the device; it is not intrinsically offensive, since there
is no restraint or exposure and, even during the period prior to the
December 5th rules, everyone seeking to board was subjected to identical treatment, even though only Profile selectees were actually monitored. More sophisticated devices using x-rays or fluoroscopy 136 would
intrude more significantly since they reveal more intimate detail.
Thus, holding that the magnetometer scan is a search is advantageous
for two reasons. First, it is clearly compatible with Katz. Second, it
would not require courts to make qualitative, search/no search distinctions as more intrusive scanners were put into use, but would permit
130 See Wahl, How Science Will Foil the Skyjackers, 97 PoPULAR MECHANICS 58 (Nov.
1970), describing the magnetometer and how it operates.
131 Id. at 59.
132 See Letter and Ground Deterrence of Aircraft Hijacking, AN 107-2, at 4, from M.M.
Schwartz, President, Infinetics, Inc., to The University of Chicago Law Review, Jan. 3,
1973. Mr. Schwartz estimates that his firm supplies "perhaps 98%" of the world's metal
detection devices.
138 United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086, 1097 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Wahl, supra
note 130, at 59.
234 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see text at notes 83-84 supra.
135 389 U.S. at 853. The two prior cases were Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 48
(1928) and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
136 See Fenello, supra note 6, at 89-40; Wahl, supra note 130, at 123.
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them to distinguish quantitatively in terms of the extent of the
intrusion.
To date, the courts have given only limited consideration to the
fourth amendment problems raised by magnetometer scanning. In
United States v. Epperson,137 the court, upholding a magnetometer
search, said that: "[t]he search for the sole purpose of discovering
weapons and preventing air piracy, and not for the purpose of discovering weapons and pre-criminal events, fully justified the minimal
invasion of personal privacy by magnetometer. The use of the device,
unlike frisking, cannot possibly be 'an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.' "18 The court found an "overwhelming
governmental interest" in preventing hijackings, and found that this
interest justified the routine subjection of passengers to magnetometer
searches. 18 9 In United States v. Slocum, 40 the court cited Epperson in
sustaining a magnetometer search, adding that "[r]easonableness is the
ultimate standard" in determining whether fourth amendment guarantees were violated. 141 Both the Slocum and Epperson courts, however,
seem to have resolved the issue of reasonableness by giving conclusive
weight to the government's interest in protecting air passengers from
the "potential consequences" of hijacking,142 with little consideration
to the individual's fourth amendment interest in freedom from intrusion into his personal privacy or to the Terry decision and its relevance
to airport searches. 143
In Terry, Camara, and the border search cases, it was held that
though serious potential consequences may contribute to justify a
warrantless search, the search must be narrowly directed to the danger
it is intended to avert, and the presence of the danger must be indicated by specific and articulable facts. Thus, contrary to the implications of Epperson and Slocum, the "overwhelming government inter137 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).
138 Id. at 771. The distinction between "discovering weapons and preventing air piracy"

on the one hand, and "discovering weapons and pre-criminal events" on the other, is illusory. All manner of criminal activity is being sought out and punished as a result of
airport searches. See text and note at note 122 supra.
139 454 F.2d at 771.
140 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972).
141 Id. at 1182.
142 In Slocum, Chief Judge Seitz stated: "[W]e conclude that within the context of a
potential hijacking the necessarily limited search accomplished by use of the magnetometer
per se is justified by a reasonable governmental interest in protecting national air commerce. Under the circumstances suggesting a potential for the serious consequences incident to hijackings, employment of the magnetometer does not violate the 4th Amendment." Id. at 1182.
143 In Slocum, the court did not mention Terry. The sole hint of consideration of individual rights was the reference to "the necessarily limited search." Id.
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est" in preventing hijacking does not, by itself, justify intrusion; the
interest must be weighed against fourth amendment values of privacy
and personal security, and there must be an articulable apprehension
of danger in each individual case.
The use of the magnetometer involves less of an intrusion and
restraint than the stop-and-frisk in Terry. But since only a very small
number of those selected by the Profile turn out to be committing any
offense, 144 it cannot be contended that prior to the application of the
magnetometer, specific and articulable facts exist indicating possible
criminal behavior and that a "reasonable belief" exists that the suspect
is armed and dangerous. 45 Nonetheless, the principle of Terry, Camara
and the border search cases permit the magnetometer scan so long as
there is a correspondence between the extent of the intrusion and its
proferred justification. 146 It seems consistent with those cases, therefore, to conclude that the suspicion created by the Profile warrants the
limited diversion of the individual and marginal intrusion on his
privacy that use of the magnetometer requires.
If, however, the magnetometer search is justified only on the basis
of the Profile, only Profile selectees should be subjected to it. Under the
December 5th rules all passengers are required to pass through the
magnetometer, 147 and the airlines apparently have discarded the Profile as a tool for determining who will be monitored and detained upon
activation of the device. 48 This makes the magnetometer a dragnet
screening device; as such, it seems clearly unconstitutional. 149
To deal with this problem, the airlines could simply resurrect the
Profile. They could request-but not require-all or some random
number of nonselectees to pass through the magnetometer, thus preserving the Profile's secrecy. In the unlikely event that a nonselectee
objected, he could be allowed unobtrusively to board without passing
through. If a selectee objected, the airline agent could inform the
traveler quietly that he must pass through the magnetometer if he
144

Altogether, only about six thousand airport arrests have been made. Lindsey, Rul-

ing Restricts Airport Searches, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1972, § 1, at 29, col. 1.
145 However, this was, in effect, the assertion made by Chief Judge Seitz in Slocum,
where he argued that use of the magnetometer, unsupported by any justification, was permitted in view of the compelling governmental interest in preventing hijacking.
146 See note 127 supra.
147 U.S. Dep't of Transportation, News, 103-72, Dec. 5, 1972, at 1.
148 Eastern Airlines claims that it no longer uses the Profile and relies strictly on the
magnetometer and mandatory luggage search. Letter from Michael J. Fenello, supra note
72. Previously, though all passengers were required to walk through the magnetometer,
only Profile selectees were actually monitored.
149 The same problems render the carry-on luggage search invalid. See text at notes
152-8 infra.
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wants to board. Assuming that the Profile is statistically reliable, this
procedure would at once avoid the constitutional objections to universal, mandatory magnetometer searches, maintain the secrecy of the
Profile, avoid the delay resulting from questioning and possibly frisking
each of the many passengers who activate the magnetometer,'5 0 and
151
involve only a slight change in present airline procedures.
Although no court to date has had any difficulty using conventional
fourth amendment analysis to find that the combination of Profile,
magnetometer, and interrogation justifies a limited Terry-type search
for weapons, the analysis of constitutional principles involved in reaching that result has been inadequate. The validity of the Profile has not
been subjected to adequate analysis-an analysis that might well prove
fatal. More important, given the requirement of the December 5th
rules that all passengers be screened by magnetometers, no court has
dealt with the question of the degree of specific and articulable facts
required to support use of the magnetometer. Only by confronting
these problems can any meaningful conclusion be drawn as to the constitutionality of airport searches.
3. The Search of Carry-On Luggage. No court has yet considered
the requirement, included in the December 5th rules, that all airlines
conduct a search of the contents of all passengers' carry-on luggage prior
to boarding. There can be no doubt that the carry-on luggage inspection is a search, nor can the extent of the intrusion be considered
minimal. The contents of a person's briefcase or other personal belongings clearly represent items toward which he may harbor a reasonable
"expectation of privacy."' 52 Yet carry-on luggage is subjected to search
even though its owner in no way raises any suspicion of being a potential hijacker. In 1969, the peak year in United States hijacking, there
& 5 but only forty
were 150 million domestic passenger emplanements'
attempted hijackings; 54 assuming that two hijackers were involved in
each attempt, 55 only about one of every two million passengers was a
150 Approximately 50 percent of all passengers activate the magnetometer. See note 153

supra.
151 The FAA, which imposed the dragnet magnetometer screening requirement by virtue of its rulemaking authority, see text and notes at notes 70-72 supra, could similarly
reinstate the Profile.
152 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
153

U.S. DE'r OF

TRANSPORTATION,

FAA

STATISICAL HANDBOOKor

AVIATIoN 139 (1970).

154 Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Registered Aircraft, supra note 2.
155 This is, in fact, a rather generous assumption. See HousE COifhr. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
supra note 18, at 13, indicating that sixty-five persons had been involved in thirty-eight attempted hijackings to Cuba between 1961 and 1968. In U.S. hijacking history, 213 persons
have been involved in 159 attempts. See text at notes 112-113 supra.
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hijacker. Nonetheless, the carry-on luggage search assumes that every
air traveler is a hijacking suspect.
The carry-on luggage search falls within none of the exceptions to
the rule against warrantless searches thus far recognized by the Court.
It is not made incident to a lawful arrest, nor can it be analogized to
the frisk for weapons in Terry in which the officer had reasonable
grounds to believe that the suspect was armed and dangerous. Furthermore, neither the border search nor the Camara cases support the constitutionality of the carry-on luggage search. An airport boarding gate
is not an international boundary and, in any case, border searches
require at least a suspicion of wrongdoing-a suspicion totally absent
in the dragnet carry-on luggage search. Although Camara authorized
area warrants based on an official's appraisal of conditions in an area
as a whole, it nonetheless requires some showing "particularly describing the place to be searched" and what the official was looking for. It
may be argued that because the passenger, unlike the residential dwelling in Camara, is mobile, the warrant requirement should be waived.
But even if this is so, there is no reason to require any lower standard
than the suspicion required in border search cases-a standard that
cannot be met by a dragnet search.
It has been argued that, because one hijacker can endanger numerous
people and millions of dollars worth of machinery, no particularized
grounds for a carry-on luggage search should be required. 156 The aggregate cost of hijacking, in terms of loss of life, property damage, and
monetary cost, is, however, far less than the cost of other serious, and
many not-so-serious crimes. 157 The weakness of the "great danger"
156 See United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972), in which Judge Friendly, in a
concurring opinion, argued that "the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so
long as the search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or
like damage and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of
his liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air." Id.
at 675. Judge Mansfield, concurring in Bell, argued that, if danger alone justified searching, "the sharp increase in the rate of serious crimes in our major cities could equally be
used to justify similar searches of persons or homes in high crime areas .... " Id. at 676.
157 In 1970, for example, there were over 1.7 million cases of larceny over $50, and over
900,000 cases of auto theft. COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DE VELOPMENT, REDUCING CRIME AND
ASSURING JusncE 80 (1972). Taking only these two common crimes against property, the
cost far exceeds the costs of hijacking estimated in part M of this comment, infra. Even
in terms of cost of human lives, there is no comparison between hijacking, which, in its
entire history, has only touched about 50,000 passengers and 5,000 crew members, according
to one source, see Friedlander, supra note 5 (the estimate seems quite high), and homicide,
of which there were over 15,000 instances in the U.S. in 1970 alone, COMm. FOR ECONOMIC
DEvs.LoPsrAm,
supra, at 80. In the history of U.S. hijacking attempts, a total of twelve
persons (including six hijackers) have been killed and nineteen persons have been injured.
Trilling, Total Airport Security Systems, Remarks before the Air Transport Security
Panel, 1973 Sociey of Automotive Engineers National Air Transportation Meeting, Miami,
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argument becomes clear when extended to its logical extreme. An
atomic bomb smuggled into the city of Chicago would pose a tremendous threat to people and property. Under the "great danger" argument, the fact that no one has ever attempted to detonate an atomic
bomb in Chicago is irrelevant, since the danger-destruction of the
city or a large part of it-is so great that if it happened even once it
would be a catastrophe of incredible proportion. Yet, if danger alone
were sufficient to justify an exception to the rule against warrantless
searches, the police could set roadblocks on every road leading into
cities to search cars for bombs.
The hijacking problem differs, of course, from the bomb or streetcrime examples since the number of people searched is limited to those
who wish to board a plane. But this argument is really one of degree:
the street-crime analogy could be narrowed to a single precinct, ward,
or block. In Lankford v. Gelston,158 the fourth circuit held violative of
the fourth amendment a police search, conducted over a nineteen-day
period, of three hundred dwellings in a Baltimore community. The
police, looking for two armed robbers who had been traced to the
general community, searched private homes on the basis of unverified
anonymous tips. While it is perhaps more aesthetically pleasing to be
searched by a courteous guard at an airline boarding gate than to be
awakened at night by the police, a similar invasion of privacy is present
in both cases. And arguably, the searches in Lankford were more
justifiable since they were at least based on some small, articulable
ground for suspicion and were confined to a small group. Since there
is neither probable cause, specific and articulable facts, nor even
"border search" or "magnetometer-type" suspicion in the carry-on luggage case, such searches seem constitutionally impermissible, at least in
the absence of valid consent.
4. Consent Problems. In Lopez 59 and United States v. Meulener, 600
the district courts rejected the government's contention that because
notices are placed in boarding areas and on the passengers' tickets warning that persons and belongings are subject to search, attempting to
board an aircraft constitutes implied consent to an airport search. In
Fla., April 24, 1973, at 7. Dr. Trilling notes that at least 183 passengers and twenty-seven
crew members have been killed aboard U.S. registered aircraft as a result of bomb sabotage
incidents; worldwide since 1949, the toll has been 535 people killed. Id.
No one would suggest that the high incidence of street crime justifies dragnet searches
of pedestrians, even in "high crime" areas. See United States v. Mallides, No. 72-1898 (9th
Cir. Jan. 22, 1973), at n. 3. See also note 123 supra.
158 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
'59 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
160 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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Meulener, the court stated that such notices were insufficient to meet
the knowing waiver standard of Cipres.'01 The court held that a passenger who fits the Profile and activates the magnetometer may constitutionally be searched only if he is advised that he has the right to refuse
to be searched if he consents not to board the aircraft.16 2 Since the
defendant in Meulener had opened his suitcase containing narcotics
"at a time when he was not free to leave or to avoid the search," the
03
court held that the search was inherently coercive.'
Neither the Meulener nor the Lopez court considered the argument
that, since carry-on luggage will not be searched if checked and stowed
in the belly of the aircraft, 64 a person implicitly consents to have his
carry-on luggage searched when he attempts to board. If the courts
accepted this argument, air travelers would be required to forego their
fourth amendment rights if they prefer to maintain personal control
over their property during flight. On the other hand, the cost of retaining fourth amendment rights is small-the passenger is deprived of his
property only for the short time he is on the aircraft-and the need,
prevention of hijacking, is great. If contraband begins turning up in
carry-on luggage subjected to the dragnet search, this argument may
receive considerable attention. 65
Indeed, the argument might be reasonable if no alternative to dragnet searches were available. In fact, however, holding the carry-on
search unconstitutional and requiring justification for magnetometer
161 Id.

at 1287-88.

Id. at 1289. The court stated that neither the defendant's person nor his suitcase
could be searched if he chose not to board. With respect to a frisk of the defendant's person, this statement seems questionable. The court said that the governmental interest
justifying a frisk in the airport case was protection of the passengers and crew on the airplane. Id. But it seems reasonable that, when a marshal informs a selectee that he may
not board, the marshal himself may be physically endangered, thus bringing into play the
rationale of Terry and justifying a frisk whether or not the selectee desires to board.
103 Id. at 1288.
164 But see United States v. Burton, 351 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Mo. 1972), in which the
court, in a bench trial, found the defendant guilty of delivery of a firearm for transportation in interstate commerce without proper notice to the carrier. An airline employee discovered the firearm in the defendant's suitcase, which had been checked on the flight that
the defendant was preparing to board. In an earlier suppression hearing the court held
the search of the defendant's suitcase was valid. United States v. Burton, 341 F. Supp. 802
(W.D. Mo. 1972). The arline employee had made the search on his own initiative, after
observing that the defendant (who, incidentally, had purchased a round trip ticket) met the
Profile, and that one of his bags-the one ultimately found to contain the firearm-was
heavy and the weight unevenly distributed. After opening the suitcase and finding the firearm, the agent called a U.S. marshal, who arrested the defendant. Id. at 804-05.
165 But see Lindsey, supra note 122, to the effect that arrests have declined since implementation of the December 5th rules, indicating that passengers are aware of airport
searches and are stowing items in their checked luggage to avoid searches.
162
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screening need not mean that a hijacker could secret a weapon in a
briefcase or on his person and avoid detection. Profile selectees could
be required to walk through the magnetometer with their carry-on
luggage in hand.16 6 If a selectee activated the magnetometer, he could
be relieved of his carry-on luggage and asked to walk through again.
If he activated the device a second time, grounds would exist to request
identification, question the selectee, and, if necessary, perform a frisk.
In such a case, the selectee's hand luggage could be separately screened,
perhaps with a hand-held device, to determine if it, too, might contain
weapons. If the hand-held device indicated that the hand luggage contained a high level of ferrous metal, or if the selectee, without his hand
luggage, did not activate the magnetometer, grounds would exist for
questioning the selectee about the contents of his hand luggage. If the
selectee could not explain why his hand luggage had activated the
magnetometer, grounds would exist for a search. 16 7 This alternative
procedure' 68 would both serve the deterrent and detection functions
166 Under the FAA's December 5th rules, as implemented by the airlines, only the passenger walks through the magnetometer; his luggage is handed to him on the other side
by the attendant performing the carry-on search. Thus, unless the attendant actually sees
a weapon in the course of the carry-on search, it will escape detection.
167 The amount of metal in the frame and locks of many attache cases might trigger the

magnetometer, effectively giving grounds to search every briefcase-bearing passenger. This
problem could be solved by screening such cases separately with a magnetometer tuned to
pick up metal levels in excess of those contained in their frames. Alternatively, magnetometer-watchers could be supplied with a list of the most popular attache cases on the market and their ferrous metal levels when empty; when the magnetometer indicated a metal
level in excess of the stated level for a particular model case, grounds would exist for inquiry into the nature of its contents.
168 With one small but significant exception, this is the sysem proposed by S. 39, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., which has passed the Senate and now awaits consideration by the House.
As explained in the committee report, CoMMy. ON COMMERCE, REPORT ON S. 39, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (Comm. Print 1978), the Profile would not be used to identify selectees.
Rather, all passengers would be required to pass through the magnetometer. The bill
adopts this approach apparently because of the committee's belief that the Profile "has
not been totally effective in safeguarding our air transportation system from attack." Id.
at 8. The committee report states that "occasions have occurred in which, during the pressures of boarding, agents have inadvertently not applied the profile to all passengers, or
have applied it incorrectly." Id; see text at note 117, criticizing the Profile for this reason.
The committee's solution, however, discards the baby with the bath. The problem of ineffective or discriminatory Profile screening could be corrected by court decisions suppressing evidence when the airlines did not have one agent present at the boarding gate who
had the sole job of applying the Profile. Of course, this would still not legalize the search
if, as a statistical matter, the Profile is no better than random selection. But it does achieve
two important results. First, it provides a basis for magnetometer screening, which, on a
dragnet basis, is clearly unconstitutional. Second, it greatly minimizes the extent of the
screening task. Under the December 5th rules and S. 89, all passengers must be monitored
by magnetometer and detained if they activate the device. Since about half of all pas-
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of the present system and, at the same time, avoid the tension between
the present system and fourth amendment rights.1 9
B.

Right to Travel Problems

Even absent right to privacy considerations, airport searches, as
governmentally imposed burdens on travelers, are constitutionally suspect. In a series of cases' 70 the Supreme Court has protected the right
of persons to travel from state to state and abroad, holding that any
burden on the right to travel is subject to close scrutiny and must be
"necessary to promote a compelling government interest."' 1 1 Recently,
however, in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v.
Delta Airlines,'72 the Court held that a nondiscriminatory airport fee
of one dollar per passenger was not a burden in the constitutional
sense on the right to travel; since the revenue was used to build and
maintain airport facilities, the fees promoted rather than discouraged
travel. Instead of applying the strict scrutiny standard, the Court
looked to whether the fee charged was reasonably proportionate to the
benefits received. It may be argued, therefore, that if the burdens imposed on air travelers by airport searches are reasonably related to the
sengers activate the magnetometer, this task is monumental. Since only 0.5 percent fit the
Profile, the screening task and the attendant delay would be minimal.
In addition, S.39 would permit a passenger who appears to have a weapon on his per-

son to avoid a frisk by declining to board the aircraft. This is the same position taken by
Judge Ferguson in Meulener, see note 162 supra, and it shares the same problem: if a
selectee may have weapons on his person, he may be sufficiently dangerous to justify the
officer in the belief that a frisk is necessary for the protection of himself and those nearby.
169 The courts have yet to consider the argument that implied consent to an airport
search exists because alternative means of transportation are available. The argument was
alluded to in United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, at 675 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J. concurring), quoted at note 156 supra. It is marginal at best; at worst, it collides squarely
with the individual's right to travel, since there may be no satisfactory alternative means
of transportation available to one desiring to travel any substantial distance.
170 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 237, 285 (1970) (concurring opinions of Brennan and Stewart, JJ.); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33 (1915). See generally Z. CHAFxx, TrEE HUMAN RIrrs IN TH CoNsrrTrION OF
1787, at 162 ff. (1956); Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 COLUM. L. Rxv. 47
(1956); Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 IowA L. Rav. 6 (1955); Note, Interstate Migration and PersonalLiberty, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 1032 (1940); Comment, The Right to Travel
-Its Protection and Application Under the Constitution, 40 U. Mxssomu-KANsAs Crry L.

REv. 66 (1971).
171 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339, (1972), quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis in the original).
172 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
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increased security that they receive, the searches are not an impermissible burden on the right to travel.
If, however, air travelers must forego fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures as a condition of boarding,
the present airport search procedure places a double burden on constitutionally protected rights: the traveler is allowed to exercise his
right to travel only if he consents to a search that is constitutionally
impermissible. 173 Under these circumstances, the burden on travel
should be measured by the strict scrutiny standard, and should be
justified only by a compelling government interest. 74 Both the Lopez
and Muelener courts held that no such interest compels the present
procedure. 7 5 It is not enough that the procedure be reasonable; it
must be the least burdensome means of attaining the end of air safety.
Since the carry-on luggage search is, as presently conducted, largely
ineffective 76 and since a less burdensome alternative for screening hand
luggage exists, 177 Lopez and Meulener seem correct in concluding that
air travel may not be conditioned upon consent to the carry-on search.
C.

Summary

The airport search procedure can best be viewed as an ascending
spiral of intrusions, each based upon and more intrusive than its predecessor. The Profile is the key element in the procedure since, while not
itself a search, it may provide the limited justification necessary for the
slightly intrusive magnetometer scan. Under careful consideration, the
invalidity178 of the Profile may render it insufficient to justify even this
narrow intrusion. If, however, Profile identification is deemed sufficiently valid, it may serve as the starting point for a search procedure
including magnetometer scan, frisk for weapons and, only then, inspec173 See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), holding that the denial of
passports to members of the Communist party burdened both free speech and the right
to travel.
174 See note 171 supra; cf. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. at 520 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
175 Moreover, "the government ... [cannot] condition the exercise of the . .. constitutional right to travel on the voluntary relinquishment of... Fourth Amendment rights."
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Menlener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
178 See note 166 supra; text at note 206 infra.
177 See text and notes at notes 166-169 supra.
178 Validity is a threshold statistical matter; it means that the Profile would have to

turn up more potential hijackers than would be produced by a random selection of passengers who were then subjected to magnetometer screening, interrogation, and frisk. But
beyond this threshold validity, the information provided by the Profile would, as a matter of law, also have to be found to be sufficiently specific and articulable to justify the
limited intrusion inherent in the magnetometer.
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tion of carry-on luggage. Nonetheless, even passengers who are frisked
should be given the option of not boarding the aircraft before their
carry-on luggage is inspected. The luggage search constitutes what the
Court in Terry termed a "full-blown search," and may not be necessary
to protect the officer and those nearby provided that the passenger
consents not to board the flight. It should, therefore, be supported by
nothing less than probable cause. Unless the suspect insists on boarding, such support is lacking. In any event, both magnetometer screening
unsupported by Profile selection and dragnet searches of all passengers'
carry-on luggage-the procedures mandated by the FAA's December
5th rules179-seem constitutionally impermissible.
III.

TH-E

COST OF SEARCHING AND ALTERNATIVES

In addition to the constitutional problems they raise, the cost of
magnetometer screening and the universal carry-on luggage search
mandated by the FAA seems excessive when compared to the costs of
the hijackings they are intended to deter. Several kinds of costs are
incurred when an aircraft is hijacked. First, there are costs involved in
operating the aircraft over the extra distance it must travel due to the
diversion, including the costs of fuel, wear-and-tear on the plane, extra
maintenance, landing fees, and compensation of crew. Occasionally,
there may be a ransom paid that is not recovered. There is also the
actuarial value of the dangers imposed by hijackings-the value of the
injuries that may occur to persons on the plane or on the ground and
of the damage that may be done to the aircraft or other property,
discounted by the probability that such losses will occur. Its dollar
amount is perhaps best approximated by any increased insurance premiums that airlines have to pay as a result of the threat of hijacking.
Hijacking involves, as well, less easily quantifiable costs related to the
inconvenience hijackings impose upon passengers. Passengers aboard
the hijacked plane will be delayed in reaching their planned destination; passengers planning to board the plane at its scheduled stop and
travel to its next destination will either be delayed or some alternative
cost will be incurred for a replacement plane and crew. Finally, it is
possible that fear of hijacking causes anxiety to potential passengers
thus reducing the perceived benefits of air travel and, perhaps, resulting in a diminution of the number of passengers who choose air travel
over alternative means of transportation.
The costs of preventing hijacking are of three principal varieties:
operating costs, capital costs, and delay. Operating expenditures pay
179

See text and note at note 72 supra.
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the salaries of armed guards and personnel who perform the carry-on
search, apply the Profile, and monitor the magnetometer. Capital costs
include the training of these persons and the acquisition of magnetometers. Delay occurs because travelers may have to get to the airport
earlier due to the search; a person who arrives late may, because a
search is required, miss his flight altogether. 80 Finally, there is a certain
psychological cost associated with the inconvenience and insult that
the search procedure entails.
The FAA has never attempted to quantify in dollar terms the costs
of the items on both sides of the hijacking balance sheet."8 " Some tentative conclusions can be drawn, however, on the basis of the limited
data available. Although the costs resulting from the additional operation of the aircraft and services of the crew during hijackings have
never been calculated, these costs are precisely the same as those involved in the day-to-day operation of the aircraft and can be approximated by application of the rates airlines charge for the charter of
planes and crew.8 2 Although ransom money has occasionally been paid,
8 3
it has quite often been recovered and this cost is likely to be small.
Despite initial concern that insurance premiums would rise,8 4 the
actuarial value of the dangers involved in hijacking is so slight that
the insurance premiums paid by airlines have not been increased 8 5
nor have carriers obtained special coverage for losses due to hijacking. 8 6 The inconvenience to those aboard the few hijacked flights is,
in all likelihood, balanced by the inconvenience to all passengers on
all flights under the total security program mandated by the December
5th order.1 7 And the reduction, if any, in air travel due to fear of hi180 See, e.g., Lindsey, supra note 122 (describing such an incident).

181 The Director of Security, Air Transport Association of America, states that "there
are tvo studies undervay in this regard." Letter from Harry J. Murphy, to The University
of Chicago Law Review, Jan. 3, 1973.
182 The Boeing 727 aircraft has been the most frequent target of hijackers, having been
attacked fifty-four times; the DC-8 is second, with twenty-eight attempts. Hijacking
Statistics, supra note 3, at 2. The cost of chartering a 727 with crew is $2.35 per mile plus
a $1,300 departure fee. Letter from Michael J. Fenello, supra note 72. Mr. Fenello noted
that Cuba has imposed landing and servicing fees as much as $9,000 (although on another
occasion the fee was $1,620), depending on the length of stay in Cuba, but observed that
"this cost is not of major importance." Id. See also note 199 infra.
183 Including the Southern Airways incident, see note 71 supra, extortionists have been
paid $9.3 million by U.S. air lines; all but $503,000 has been recovered. Lindsey, 2-Million
Ransom Imperils Airline, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1972, at 1, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, at 33,
col. 4 (reporting the recovery of the Southern Ainvays ransom).
184 See Wall Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1970, at 4, col. 2; id., Sept. 10, 1970, at 3, col. 1.
L85 Letter from Michael J. Fenello, supra note 72.
186 Letter from Howard Bisgard, Manager of Special Projects, United Air Lines, to
The University of Chicago Law Review, Mar. 5, 1973.
187 Mr. Fenello states that during February, 1973, the first complete month the airlines
have operated under the FAA December 5th rules, Eastern experienced an average of six
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jacking'88 may well be balanced by the reduction in travel by persons
unwilling either to go through the search procedure or to pay the
addition to the price of air fares that the program may require.
At the same time, searching for hijackers can be quite costly. Prior to
the December 5th order, direct dollar outlays for anti-hijacking programs were minimal. Since the Profile was applied and the magnetometer monitored as part of the normal responsibilities of airline agents,
no additional personnel were needed. Capital costs were also small8 9
since the Profile/magnetometer system requires only slight training
costs and the most commonly used magnetometer sells for about
$1,000.190 The FAA's December order, however, will increase the cost
of deterring hijacking significantly. The cost of personnel to search
carry-on luggage and monitor magnetometers 11 has been estimated at
more than $50 million annually.19 2 Some major trunk airlines have contracted with private investigative and security organizations to perform
the carry-on search at a price of as much as $3 million per carrier per
annum, 19 3 and airlines attempting to perform the searches with their
own personnel will probably incur comparable costs. 94 The cost of
providing law enforcement personnel at all boarding gates will be
security delays a day of approximately nine minutes each, out of an average of 1359
scheduled departures daily. Letter from Michael J. Fenello, supra note 72. Even if this

record remains constant over a twelve-month period, each of the forty attempted hijackings
in 1969 would have had to result in an average per flight delay of nearly nine hours in
order for the total delay due to hijacking in its peak year on all domestic airlines to equal
the annual delay due to searching on Eastern alone. Under the "sterile concourse" concept

in use at several large terminals, see Lindsey, Airports Restrict Public In a New Security

Move, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1972, at 1, col. 1, the searches are made at the entrance to
the gate concourse instead of at the boarding gate for each individual flight. This should
enable the airlines to avoid security delays. However, passengers will still be delayed; they
will simply be required to arrive at the airport earlier in order to clear the security web
in time to board their flight.
188 Mr. Fenello states that Eastern is not aware of any decrease in air travel attributed
to hijacking, but adds that passengers overwhelmingly favor antipiracy measures. Letter of
Michael J. Fenello, supra note 72.
189 Eastern has spent about five hundred thousand dollars for weapons detection equip-

ment. Id.

190 Letter and Ground Deterrenceof Aircraft Hijacking,AN 107-2, supra note 132.

191 Since the airlines already used magnetometers fairly extensively, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the bulk of the additional manpower will be required for carry-on luggage searching.
192 Lindsey, Airports Expect Delay on Guards, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1972, at 42, col. 1.
The Times quoted the Air Transport Association as estimating that the cost to the nation's
twenty-four major scheduled airlines would be about $56 million. The ATA estimate,
which amounted to more than $113 million for implementation of the entire December
program, is developed in detail in Aviation Daily, Jan. 2, 1973, at 7.
193 Wall Street Journal, Dec. 22, 1972, at 22, col. 3. Eastern, which has contracted out
the carry-on search job, estimates its cost at $4 million per year. Letter of Michael J.
Fenello, supra note 72.
104 Wall Street Journal, Dec. 22, 1972, at 22, col. 3.
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nearly as great as that of searching hand luggage. The FAA order,
which, as to armed security personnel, became effective on February 16,
1973, applies to each of the nation's 531 airports served by a certified
carrier. 195 Compliance with the order will require some 4,500 local law
enforcement officers; 196 the estimated $47 million cost will be paid by
municipalities, which, in turn, are expected to raise charges to airlines
using their facilities. 197 Thus, the total cost of implementing the new
security requirements will be about $100 million per annum.19 Whatever the precise cost of hijacking may be, it is doubtful that it even
approaches this figure. 99
There has been widespread objection to the new security requirements from municipalities and the airline industry.200 Although the
FAA will train all supervisory personnel, local governments will be responsible for recruiting supervisors and for both recruiting and training those who serve under them. 20 1 In many cases, local airport author195 37 Fed. Reg. 25934 (1972).
196 Lindsey, supra note 192. Two hundred-thirty federal deputy marshals and 1,071
customs agents, coordinated by 327 employees of the FAA, have in the past provided
security at 123 major United States airports. Witkin, Government to Issue Rule Requiring Airport Guards, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.).
197 Lindsey, supra note 192. But see note 202 infra.
198 Buckhorn, Who'll Guard Against Air Piracy?, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Dec. 15,
1972, at 1, col. 3; Lindsey, supra note 192.
199 A Boeing 727, the type of aircraft that has been hijacked most frequently, could, on
the basis of the figures cited in note 182 supra, be chartered for an around the world
flight for sixty thousand dollars. If each of the thirty-one attempted hijackings in 1972
had resulted in such a diversion, the total operational cost would have come to only about
$1,860,000. It has been conservatively estimated that a typical successful hijacking incident
could cost as much as $25,000, excluding extortion money and property damage and personal injury. Trilling, supra note 157, at 6.
200 See, e.g., Witkin, supra note 196; Lindsey, supra note 192.
201 Witkin, supra note 196. A bill passed by the Senate in 1972 would have provided
for establishment of a consolidated airport security force under the FAA, with an annual
budget of $35 million. The Anti-Hijacking Act of 1972, S. 2280, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
The bill, strongly supported by the air transportation industry, died in the House under
heavy White House pressure. Opening Statement by Senator Cannon, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce on the Administration's Emergency Anti-Hijacking Regulations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973). The current S. 39, see
note 168 supra, incorporates these provisions. However, the Fiscal Year 1973 Department
of Transportation Appropriation Act, H.R. 15097, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 580 (1972)
did permit the FAA to purchase and assign to the airlines $3.5 million of detection equipment for use at United States airports. In separate statements made on December 5th,
1972, Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe and Benjamin 0. Davis, Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Safety and Consumer Affairs, stated that a substantial number
of detection devices had been purchased and that $2.5 million had been earmarked for
additional purchases as needed. U.S. Dep't of Transportation, News, Remarks by Secretary
of Transportation John A. Volpe, Announcing Air Transport Security Program, Dec. 5,
1972, at 2; U.S. Dep't of Transportation, News, Remarks by General Benjamin 0. Davis Jr.,
Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Safety and Consumer Affairs, at News Conference
on Expanded Air Security Program, Dec. 5, 1972 at 2.
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ities have long-term contracts with airlines that may preclude them
from passing on the added costs of the program.2 0 2 Airline and airport
officials are concerned that lack of uniformity in enforcement may
result in liability if a person searched and frisked by local officers
2 03
subsequently makes a hijacking attempt.
These data present serious doubts concerning the wisdom of searching carry-on luggage and providing armed guards at every boarding
gate. If these procedures were necessary, the free market would compel
them. The Profile/magnetometer system became available in 1969, but
the airlines, reluctant to jeopardize their image of providing safe and
carefree travel, began using it only when it became clear that passengers welcomed such precautions. 204 Before January, 1973, however, only
two airlines had voluntarily begun searching carry-on luggage.20 5 If the
decision to search had been left to the market, some airlines would
probably have chosen to do so and others not. Passengers could then
have selected among, for example, a flight that used total security, one
that used only the Profile/magnetometer system, and one on which no
precautions were used, all at slight differences in price. Ultimately, the
market would have dictated the right combination of security procedures and cost.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that the additional security measures
required by the December 5th order will be any more successful in
eliminating all hijacking than were the limited measures previously in
use. One of the two hijackings that led to the December rules involved
a group of men who shot their way onto the aircraft;20 6 it is doubtful
that an armed guard could have prevented such conduct. Neither the
magnetometer nor luggage search can detect a person carrying a weapon
202 Letter of Donald L. Coe, Airport Commissioner, Chattaqua County Airport, Maryvile, New York, to The University of Chicago Law Review, Mar. 8, 1973. Mr. Coe notes

that Chattaqua County Airport is operated on a nonprofit basis and was operating at a
deficit even before the new security program, which will force the airport deeper into the
red. The airport's annual budget, exclusive of the cost of armed guards, was $114,000. The
armed guard requirement will be satisfied by using police officers from the nearby Town
of Endicott and sheriff's deputies, at an annual cost of $12,000. Mr. Coe believes that antihijacking procedures are needed, especially at larger airports, but that the major portion of
the cost should be borne by the federal government: "A program of this sort can raise havoc
with a small operation. When the Federal government can make a change in regulations
and increase the cost of the airport operation 10% in one day, something should be done."
Id. No flight departing from or bound for Chattaqua County Airport has ever been the
target of a hijacking attempt. See Chronology of U.S. Hijackings, supra note 15.
203 Witkin, supra note 196. Lack of uniformity may also lead to abuse of civil rights by
overzealous local police officers. See Lindsey, Ruling Restricts Airport Searches, supra note

144.
204
205

Fenello, supra note 6, at 29.
See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 22, 1972, at 22, col. 3.

206 See note 71 supra.
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containing an amount of ferrous metal lower than that for which the
magnetometer is tuned, or one made from an alloy. Finally, although
the new measures may have a significant deterrent effect, 207 it may be
no greater than the deterrence that would be provided if the Profile/
magnetometer system were used on all flights.
The FAA and the airlines have claimed that because the number of
successful hijackings has decreased since the development of the Profile/magnetometer system, the system is a success. 208 But since the danger in hijacking occurs when an individual threatens a passenger or
crew-member on board an aircraft, neither capturing a hijacker en
route nor convincing him to surrender avoids the harm toward which
an antihijacking program must be directed-attempteddiversion of an
aircraft from its planned route by violence or threat of violence against
the aircraft, passenger or crew. To avoid this harm, potential hijackers
must be deterred or prevented from boarding; the success or failure of
hijackings is irrelevant in measuring the adequacy of an antihijacking
system, except insofar as an increased rate of failure discourages future
hijacking attempts.
The important factor is, therefore, whether the number of attempted
hijackings has been reduced. Following development of the Profile/
magnetometer system, the number of attempts dropped somewhat 0 9 and
it is, of course, possible that a number of potential attempts were
deterred. Following the January 31, 1972, order bringing antihijacking
security measure under the FAA's direct control, there were two waves
of extortion attempts in March and July; however, in the following
five months the incidence of hijacking reached its lowest point in five
years.2 10 It seems reasonable to conclude that the FAA's actions following the January 31st order and preceding the December 5th order
were effective, along with other factors, in deterring hijackings.
The FAA's December 5th order, motivated by the two violent hijackings in the fall of 1972, can be viewed as an attempt to eliminate the
last vestiges of hijacking at a very high ($100 million) marginal cost.
Even assuming that it can eliminate all hijackings, this large marginal
207 It is conceivable, however, that the measures will simply cause hijackers to use force
before boarding the aircraft-in effect, moving the hijacking from the aircraft to the concourse. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1973, § 1, at 52, col. 3, describing an incident at an airport
in Louisville, Kentucky, in which an AWOL soldier sprayed a crowded airport terminal
with shotgun pellets and then seized an empty aircraft and an airline mechanic as hostage,
threatening to blow up the aircraft if his demands were not met. The hijacker was ultimately subdued.
208 Fenello, supra note 6, at 30; Statement of Gen. Benjamin 0. Davis, Jr., supra note
201, at 1.
209 Chronology of U.S. Hijackings, supra note 15.
210 See text and notes at notes 60-71 supra.

19731

Searching for Hijackers

expenditure, with such wideranging effects, seems unwarranted, especially if less costly and equally effective alternatives are available.
One such alternative would be to employ, on all domestic flights, the
limited, but apparently successful, Profile/magnetometer system that
was used prior to the December 5th order, and to combine it with
diplomatic and other initiatives aimed at removing the possibility that
hijackers' objectives will be achieved. There have been four general
categories of hijackers: political refugees, 211 extortionists, terrorists,
and, most recently, "fleeing felons." 212 The primary objective of refugee hijacking is political asylum, and the best means of preventing such
hijacking seems to be the development of legal means of exit. Thus, the
hijacking of Cuban planes to the United States ended soon after the
Cuban government agreed to allow United States planes to take its
213
disaffected, or less useful, citizens to Miami.
The air extortionist of today resembles the sea pirate of the past.
The best and most economical solution to the problem he poses is to
take away his means of escape and to remove his safe havens. Parachute
extortions have apparently been eliminated by sealing the ventral and
tail cone exits of aircraft, thus making in-flight escape impossible. 214 The
two most popular havens, Cuba and Algeria, have shown increasing
interest in prosecuting or returning extortionists 215 and may decide to
join multinational conventions 218 already signed by many nations,
211 Until the recent wave of extortionist hijackings, the dominant motive of hijackers
was political. Aggarwala, supra note 9, at 8-10, 11.
212 The term "fleeing felons" was coined by Federal District Court Judge J. L. Smith in
an opinion denying an injunction barring implementation of the FAA's December armed
guard regulation. Airport Operators Council Int'l v. Shafer, 454 F. Supp. 79 (D.D.C. 1973).
213 See text and note at note 14 supra. The recent termination of the Freedom Airlift
may lead to a renewal of the Cuba-to-Miami traffic.
214 See text at notes 63-68 supra.
215 Under Scull and Crossbones, THE EcoNoAxsr, Nov. 18, 1972, at 12. Cuba announced
that she had "absolutely no interest" in serving as a refuge for common criminals, see
Szulc, Cuba and U.S. Say They Seek Accord to Curb Hijacking, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1972,
at 1, col. 8, and promptly proclaimed that she would try the perpetrators of the Southern
Airways incident, note 71 supra. Gwertzman, Cuba Will Try 3 Hijackers; Accepts Proposal
on Talks, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1972, at 1, col. 6. More recentiy, the United States reached
agreement with Cuba on the terms of an antihijacking treaty. Gwertzman, Rogers Says
U.S. Is Firm on Cuba, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1973, at 1, col. 5. For a discussion of the terms
of the agreement, see note 221 infra.
216 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and its Legal Committee
have been responsible for three multinational conventions dealing with hijacking. Discussion first began in 1950, concerning the problem of jurisdiction over offenses committed
on board an aircraft during flight over the high seas. Finally, at the IACO conference in
1963, in Tokyo, the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft was adopted and opened for signature. The Senate ratified it in 1969. 115 CONG.
R=G. 11996 (1969). The Tokyo Convention required all signatories to "take all appropriate
measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his
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promising to refuse hijackers sanctuary. It seems likely, therefore,
that extortion hijacking will come to an end as nations discover that
they derive no benefit from harboring such hijackers, and as their
punishment of hijackers becomes more widely known.
The purpose of terrorist hijacking has generally been to focus
attention on a particular political cause; 217 in some instances, this pur218 If
pose has been combined with political extortion or blackmail.
control of the aircraft," and to "permit its passengers and crew to continue their journey
as soon as practicable, and . . .return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully
entitled to possession." A harder-line American proposal, presented in an earlier draft
and requiring all nations in whose territory a hijacked aircraft might land to punish the
hijackers, was deleted altogether from the final draft adopted in Tokyo. The Tokyo
Convention had obvious weaknesses. It did little more than set forth an obligation already
implicit under international law governing foreign vessels in distress entering the port
of another country. See Text of Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, 1958, reprinted in
38 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 1115 (1958). The Tokyo Convention contained no explicit
provisions to curb or deter hijacking; there were, for example, no extradition provisions
nor even a definition of the crime of hijacking.
In 1970, the International Conference on Air Law adopted the Hague Convention in
response to the sharp increase in the number of hijackings in 1968 and 1969. By its terms,
the unlawful diversion of an aircraft was made an offense, and each signatory is obligated
to impose severe penalties for such acts and to extend its criminal jurisdiction to hijackers
in its territory, regardless of where the hijacking occurred or the state of registration of
the aircraft. If the state in which the hijacker is found does not extradite him, it must
prosecute him. The Senate ratified the Hague Convention in 1971. 117 CONG. REc. 30956
(1971).
In 1971, a diplomatic conference convened by the ICAO in Montreal adopted the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation. This
Convention was deemed necessary by the wave of terrorist activities against aircraft and
aircraft facilities in 1970, apparently related to the Middle East crisis. The provisions of
the Montreal Convention parallel those of the Hague Convention. Acts of sabotage of
aircraft, acts that endanger the safe flight of an aircraft by damaging it or destroying air
navigation facilities, acts of violence against persons on board aircraft, and bomb hoaxes
are defined as offenses. In the absence of extradition, local punishment is required. For a
detailed history of the multinational conventions dealing with air pracy, see FitzGerald,
Toward Legal Suppression of Acts Against Civil Aviation, 585 INT'L CONCILLTION 42 (1971).
Recognizing that stronger action may be necessary, the United States and Canada have
recently proposed a new treaty that would provide for suspension of all air service to
countries that fail to follow the rules set out in the Hague and Montreal conventions.
Address by John R. Stevenson to the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York and the
American Society of Int'l Law, Nov. 9, 1972, reprinted in 67 U.S. Dmv'oF STATE BuLL.
645, 647 (1972). Such a threat was used successfully by the International Federation of Air
Lines Pilots Association in 1968 to force prompt return of an El Al aircraft hijacked to
Algeria. Aggarwala, supra note 9, at 26. Though such action would obviously provide a
strong incentive for enforcement of antihijacking measures, inducing nations to comply
with the terms of an agreement to which they are not parties may be considered inappropriate to an orderly system of international cooperation.
217 For example, the Jordan desert incident. See text and note at notes 40, 46 supra.
218 For example, the hijacking of a Lufthansa jet by Palestinian commandos followed
by a demand for the release of three of the murderers of Israeli athletes at the Munich
Olympics. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
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their belief in the righteousness of their cause is sufficient to spur them
to risk their lives, terrorist hijackers are unlikely to be stopped by
even the most drastic security measures. If, however, terrorist hijackings succeed in engendering only animosity for the cause they are
intended to support, potential terrorists may recognize that their
efforts would be self-defeating. Thus, the world outrage that resulted
from the Jordanian desert incident in 1970 and the general support for
the Israeli government's refusal to return Palestinian prisoners2 19 may
220
explain why no similar exploits have since been attempted.
The "pure" criminal, or "fleeing felon," may, like the terrorist, be
so desperate that he is willing to shoot his way onto a plane. The only
way to stop such a person is by convincing him that flight will be unavailing. The removal of safe havens, either by extradition to the
country of origin or prosecution in the country of landing, will accomplish this objective. A substantial step toward the removal of Cuba as
a safe haven occurred when that nation signed an antihijacking treaty
with the United States in February, 1973.221
219 See, e.g., The Hijack War, 76 NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1970, at 20; Drama on the Desert:
The Week of the Hostages, 96 TiME, Sept. 21, 1970, at 18.
220 Following the Jordan desert incident, the Palestinians did not strike again for an
entire year. In September and October, 1971, three Jordanian aircraft were unsuccessfully
attacked, probably in retaliation for King Hussein's September, 1970, attack on Jordanbased commandos. A fourth Jordanian plane was unsuccessfully attacked in February,
1972. Again in February, 1972, the terrorists attacked a Lufthansa jumbo jet and were
paid $5 million in ransom by the German airline. In May, a Sabena airliner was hijacked
to Tel Aviv and the release of captive commandos demanded; the Israelis foiled the
terrorists, but one passenger was killed. Finally, a Lufthansa jet was hijacked and a successful demand made for the release of three terrorists held by the German government for
the massacre of eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Domestic and Foreign
Aircraft Hijackings, supra note 1. Thus, aside from the four retaliatory attacks against
Jordanian aircraft, there have been only three terrorist attempts since the desert incident
in 1970. Of those three, one was for money and another was for prisoners. The target of
both attacks was Lufthansa, the West German airline. At the time of the Jordan desert
incident, West Germany promptly agreed to release Palestinian guerillas it held in return
for German hostages. In view of this fact, it is not surprising that the guerillas picked
Lufthansa in May, 1972, when they needed money. And in the light of these events, the
October attempt to recapture the Munich murderers seems, in retrospect, to have been
almost inevitable. The Sabena attempt seems a bit illogical, but may have been a desperate
attempt to confront and embarrass the Israelis by presenting them with hostages on their
own soil.
221 The treaty, signed on February 15, 1973, called for extradition or punishment with
"the most severe penalty" of any person who "seizes, removes, appropriates or diverts from
its normal route or activities any aircraft or vessel registered under the laws of one of
the parties and brings it to the territory of the other .... " 68 U.S. Dss'T OF STATE BULL.
260 (1973). The agreement provides, however, that in punishing hijackers, the parties may
consider "any extenuating or mitigating circumstances" in cases in which the hijackers
were "being sought for strictly political reasons and were in real and imminent danger of
death without a viable alternative for leaving the country," provided there was no extortion of money or harm to passengers, crew, or others. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Airplane hijacking has affected only a very small proportion of the
air traveling public. Yet the security measures required by the FAA to
halt this menace touch every passenger and raise problems concerning
the individual's fourth amendment rights. Summarily instituted in
response to two violent hijackings in the fall of 1972, their cost is great
and their value questionable. On the other hand, the more limited
security measures relied on prior to 1973 seem to meet constitutional
standards and appear more rational from the standpoint of cost and
effectiveness. The Profile/magnetometer search procedure was never
made mandatory for all domestic flights prior to the December 5th
order. Indeed, implementation of any preboarding security measures
was totally voluntary until the January 31, 1972 order, and even then
some discretion was left to the airlines. Yet, coupled with the regularization of exit procedures for Americans wanting to go to Cuba and
once the parachute extortion gambit had run its unsuccessful course,
these measures led, in the last half of 1972, to the lightest period in
United States hijacking history since the "epidemic" began in 1968.
The majority of commentators agree that the most effective and least
expensive way to halt hijacking is by international treaty sealing off
safe havens to the sky pirate.222 In view of these considerations, the

December 5th order seems clearly excessive and should be rescinded in
favor of a constitutionally supportable procedure on every flight, or
perhaps simply a voluntary system dictated by market considerations.
Douglas M. Kraus
222 See sources cited at note 7 supra.

